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that we all of us know that there is such a law, though he
admits that it cannot be demonstrated or otherwise justi-
fied. But, he maintains, such justification is not necessary.
“I do not know how WE know that things are as they are
because they were as they were. But WE do know it.”
The last five authors quoted are at one in asserting an
alleged law of causation which turns out to be simply
Kant’s mule. None of them has troubled to ask, any more
than Kant asked, whether the two propositions of which
this hybrid is composed are compatible. No wonder that
opinions differ as to “how we know” such a piece of non-
sense, or whether “we” know it at all.
The last four have agreed in using a locution to which I
have ventured to call attention by printing the word WE
in capitals. This “indeterminate we” is so common among
philosophers that a grammarian might call it rvgla
uikorouijot, and Bacon might have classed it among the
idola theatri. The word “we” refers to a group or society of
persons among whom the speaker includes himself. It is not
used by a man who is thinking clearly unless he is prepared
to answer the question “what group is this of which you are
speaking, and what are its limits?” Philosophers have got
into the habit of using it when in fact they are quoting be-
liefs of their own sect, but when they imagine themselves to
be quoting beliefs common to the entire human race, or at
least to all such members of it as have the use of reason.
Where such language is found, an alert reader will ask “who
are YOU?” It would perhaps have surprised any of the four
writers I have quoted, to learn that the answer is
“Kantanians.” So recent is the “idea of causation” which
modern philosophical dogmatism takes for granted. So ne-
cessary is it, before swallowing whole the traditions which
this dogmatism would force down our throats, to inquire
not only into their logic but also into their history.
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Within the philosophy of science, Robin G. Collingwood’s
paper on ‘The so-called idea of causation’,1 republished
(slightly changed) as ‘Three senses of the word “cause”’ in
his Essay on Metaphysics,2 is not only regarded as an early
defence of a manipulationist account of causation, but also
as a classic reference for a debate about causal selection.
The former discusses what a cause is and the latter why
and how we select a subset of the causes of a phenomenon
to be included in the explanation of the respective phenom-
enon. With respect to causal selection, Collingwood has
(at least since H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honore´’s seminal
book Causation in the Law),3 been regarded as the de-
fender of controllability as the principle that guides causal
selection in contexts that Collingwood named ‘practical
sciences’ (e.g. law or medicine).
This commentary discusses the relevance of
Collingwood’s control principle in contemporary life sci-
ences and defends the claim that it is not the ability to con-
trol, but the willingness to control that often biases us
towards some rather than other causes of a phenomenon.
Willingness to control is certainly only one principle that
influences causal selection, but it is an important one. It
shows how norms make causes.
The problem of causal selection
When we say, for instance, that ‘The cause of malaria is
the bite of a mosquito’, an example Collingwood used,
then we know that the bite of a mosquito is only one of the
many causal factors involved in an incidence of malaria. In
the once fashionable parlance of necessary and sufficient
conditions, the mosquito bite is merely what Mackie4
called an INUS-condition, i.e. an insufficient but necessary
part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition for malaria.
Be it malaria or anything else in our world, there will
always be more than one cause for a phenomenon. Why
then can the bite of a mosquito be termed the cause, i.e.
the one cause (out of the many) included in an explanation
that is partial but explanatory nonetheless? The problem
of causal selection is the problem of understanding how
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scientists single out some causes for inclusion in an explan-
ation (foregrounding) and relegate others to the back-
ground (backgrounding).
Collingwood’s control principle
Practical sciences such as medicine are, for Collingwood,
research domains that are defined by the aim to produce
and to prevent things. They are areas in which things going
wrong are studied. In such research domains, Collingwood
claimed, it is the ability to control a causal factor that
guides scientists in selecting between causes. If I am the ex-
plainer, the cause that is included in the explanation is ‘the
thing that I can put right’ (p. 303)2. For me (or us) the ex-
planatorily relevant cause is the thing that I (or we) can
control, in the sense of putting it right.
In his example of a car failing to climb the hill,2 there is
a hill and there is a loose high-tension cable in a car. They
are causes for the stoppage of the car. The hill is a cause
since ‘more power is needed to take a car uphill than to
take it along the level’. Whether there is a hill, or not,
makes a difference and is thus causally relevant. Yet, as he
added, since we usually cannot intervene on hills (e.g. by
stamping on them), we usually ignore the hill as a cause
when we give an answer to the question ‘Why does the car
fail to climb the hill?’—and rightfully so, he believed. It
would be pointless to quote the hill as a cause of the stop-
page of the car and right to call the loose high-tension
cable the cause, simply because we can intervene in the lat-
ter but usually not the former. He concluded that in every-
day life and practical sciences, manipulability or
controllability (pick your preferred term) is a principle of
causal selection that justifiably guides our biased way of
dealing with causes. What Collingwood called the prin-
ciple of ‘relativity of causes’ (p. 304)2 follows: people differ
with respect to what they can control and hence differ with
respect to their causal explanations.
Unmanipulable causes and (ab)normality
There is a recurring critique that Collingwood’s approach
has to face (be it as a classic reference of a manipulability
account of causation or with respect to the control prin-
ciple of causal selection): first, we do regard something as
a cause and foreground it even though we cannot control it
(for a critique along these lines see e.g.3,5–7; on the problem
of the (im)possibility of interventions more generally see8);
second, there are causes we can control and background
nonetheless.9
In reaction to Collingwood, Hart and Honore´ suggested
(ab)normality as the more inclusive alternative to control-
lability: we select as the explanatorily relevant cause(s)
what is—in a given context of occurrence—abnormal (i.e.
what actually differs) and put normal factors (potential dif-
ference makers) in the background. Abnormal in this con-
text simply means ‘being different’, given a respective
context of occurrence or reference class (pick your pre-
ferred approach: see Menzies10 on the context of occur-
rence, a term he takes from Gorovitz;11 see Hesslow12 for
reference classes). If the barn on the next street burned
down the other night, a standard toy-example for the de-
bate on causal selection, we do not include oxygen in the
explanation of the fire because oxygen is normally present.
The presence of oxygen is not an explanatorily relevant
cause of the fire because, in the context at issue in the ex-
ample, it did not differ: oxygen was present when the
house burned (unusual situation) and when it did not burn
(things going on as usual). The normality approach of Hart
and Honore´ is still influential: Waters13 has a contempor-
ary elaboration on the distinction between actual vs mere
potential difference makers; Hitchcock and Knobe14
backed up Hart and Honore´’s approach, which relied on
ordinary language philosophy, with evidence from experi-
mental philosophy. However, the basic point, as they
admit (p. 601),14 is still the one from Hart and Honore´: we
can solve the selection problem by distinguishing between
what is normal and what is not.
On the basis of their normality approach, Hart and
Honore´ wrote the following on controllability: ‘What very
often brings ‘controllability’ and cause together is the fact
that our motive in looking for the abnormality which
“makes the difference” is most often the wish to control it
and through it, its sequel’ (p. 37)3.
Even though Hart and Honore´ were not convinced by
Collingwood’s control principle and suggested abnormal-
ity as alternative, their account is compatible with the idea
that we can use the control principle to select among the
abnormal factors, i.e. to select among a set of actual differ-
ence makers. In the example of the hill, the hill and the
loose high-tension cable are actual difference makers. In all
non-laboratory contexts it will seldom be that there is only
one actual difference maker, except in cases in which one
partitions one’s explanandum so that there is only one dif-
ference maker.15 Furthermore, Hart and Honore´ suggested
that the wish to control plays a role in causal selection, des-
pite the fact that some of the causes we foreground are be-
yond the respective ability to control.
I will develop Collingwood’s approach in the direc-
tion Hart and Honore´ suggested: it is the willingness
to control (rather than the ability to, or the explicit
wish to) that can often account for why certain causal
factors are picked out and others relegated to the sta-
tus of mere conditions, lingering around in the back-
ground, fixed and normal.
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What is control?
On the one hand, controlling things is making sure that
something keeps running as it normally does (by prevent-
ing change or reproducing the normal state), because it is
supposed to run like this. This is a keep-things-right or set-
things-back-to-right kind of control, it is a conservative
kind of control: you try to prevent something from chang-
ing. Yet, controlling things can also mean that we are able
to change something in a way we want it to change, we
can manipulate it. I call this forward control.
If somebody does not care or want to prevent something
from changing (conservative control), they will not pay at-
tention to, or even prevent attention to that something,
and will background it in causal explanations; if people
want to forward control something, they will pay attention
to it and include it in causal explanations. This connection
between interests, attention and control is the foundation
for how norms make causes.
How norms make causes
The thesis that I want to put forward on the basis of the
previously made distinctions is the following: norms based
on social conventions, technical possibilities and interest
can make causes in two senses: norms make causes visible
by defining what we (usually those in majority or power)
are willing to control, i.e. willing to set or keep right,
which influences whether the cause is foregrounded
(in case of forward control) or backgrounded (no care or
conservative control); this in turn makes causes real by cre-
ating or stabilizing what is normal or not, i.e. by creating
or stabilizing what will be an actual difference maker. The
first sense refers to causal selection itself and the second to
a consequent looping effect.
This approach not only allows the answering of the
above-mentioned critique of Collingwood, but also the
subsuming of Hart and Honore´’s normality principle as
one kind of control, namely keeping things normal.
In addition to the hill and fire examples, I will use evi-
dence from the history of explaining cancer and generalize
the approach developed to the overall history of genetic ex-
planations. The suggested revision of Collingwood’s con-
trol principle is thus also meant as a contribution to the so-
called parity debate, a discussion within the philosophy of
biology about why biomedical research so often singles out
genes as causes, despite their ontological parity with other
causal factors, i.e. despite the fact that we all know that it
is always nature and nurture interacting when a trait de-
velops in whatever organism we look at.
Whether the willingness-to-control principle is general-
izable to purely theoretical sciences, such as physics, is an
issue not addressed here. Collingwood himself doubted it. I
tend to agree. The goals of these sciences are just so differ-
ent, so that it is unlikely that they work the same way. And
even within the practical sciences, which aim at producing
as well as preventing, we can insert a wedge between theor-
etical contexts and practical contexts, since the control
principle might be applied in opposite ways: Weber16
claimed that in theoretical contexts it is the normal that is
foregrounded, because what one wants to explain in theor-
etical contexts of practical sciences is not malfunctioning,
i.e. things going wrong, but regular functioning, i.e. things
going right.
A new perspective on the fire example
If we go back to the fire example and the question ‘Why
did the barn on the next street burn the other night?’, the
answer might be: ‘Because kids were playing with
matches’. As mentioned above, the fact that oxygen was
present is ontologically equally causally relevant (i.e. a
cause), but we usually do not include oxygen in our ex-
planations of why a fire occurs. Oxygen is a causal factor
that is backgrounded, set to be lingering around in the
background as a (so-called) standing condition, analogous
to the hill in Collingwood’s example. Why? The ability-to-
control principle would state: because those who do the ex-
plaining cannot control the presence of oxygen. The nor-
mality principle would state: because oxygen is ubiquitous,
i.e. normally there. It is the abnormal, the thing that differs
(e.g. whether there was a lighted match or not), that
‘makes the difference’ in phenomena such as accidents, dis-
eases, deviant behaviours, i.e. in things not ‘going on as
usual’3. In the fire case, the abnormal behaviour comes
from the kids, not from the oxygen.
Do we need to decide between the two accounts? No,
because we can unite them: we background oxygen neither
because it is normal (because we could change that), nor
because we cannot control it (because we could change
that as well), but because we want to keep oxygen normal
(conservative control) or do not care about it. We fore-
ground other causal factors (e.g. the kids’ playing with
matches) because we do not approve of it and consequently
want to intervene (forward control) in it or would at least
appreciate the respective intervention.
The general claim is then: even if we cannot practically
change something (i.e. control in Collingwood’s own
terms), as long as we hope—one day—to be able to inter-
vene in it (which includes that we believe in that possibility
and would like to intervene), we foreground it and call it a
cause, if not the cause. A belief in the non-ability to control
thus would (or at least should) constrain the willingness to
control: if there is no hope whatsoever that we can one day
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gain control over a causal factor, it is rather unreasonable
to be willing to control it.
If control enters causal selection at all, then it is the will-
ingness to control, not controllability, that biases us to-
wards some causes as the difference maker of our choice.
The thing that we are prepared to change goes to the fore-
ground, the thing that we want to stay normal or do not
care to intervene on goes to the background. Thus, even if
we cannot practically intervene on a causal factor, we
might still single it out as the cause, simply because it is
what we wish to intervene on (or would accept being inter-
vened on), irrespective of whether somebody already can
or not. Factors we are not prepared to intervene on, mat-
ters of fact we want (or accept) to stay as normal as they
are, will be backgrounded; they are taken for granted or
are wilfully ignored.
As said, the claim is: we ignore oxygen as a cause of fire
(in the standard contexts of occurrence), i.e. do not care
for the presence of oxygen explanatorily, because it is
something that we care about in life; we want it to stay
normal. Causal ignoring (backgrounding) or causal selec-
tion (foregrounding) is therefore not just a matter of facts,
but a matter of policy, a matter about what ought to be
done or not done, e.g. intervening on the children (or who-
ever caused the fire) so that they do not do the things they
did. The deviant is the devil. This is how norms make
causes visible, i.e. included in an explanation, whether the
example is children and oxygen, parts of a car and hills in
daily life, or genes and environments in biomedical sci-
ences, an example to which I shall turn next.
How is the looping effect working in the fire example?
We foreground the kids’ behaviour in order to manipulate
it—in order to discipline them; if successful, the kids’
behaviour will not be (or will less likely be) an actual dif-
ference maker for future fires occurring in the neighbour-
hood. This is how causal selection is part and parcel of us
creating the patterns of differences that build the onto-
logical basis from which we can at all select causes to be
included in an explanation.
An example from the history of science:
shifts in regularity regimes of cancer
prevention
According to the historians Robert Proctor17 and
Alexander von Schwerin,18 the norms about what should
stay as it is (and thus be in the background of causal ex-
planations) historically changed with respect to regulatory
regimes of cancer prevention in interesting manners. If they
are right with their historical claims, we have a less toy-
like example that illustrates the just-made points with re-
spect to contemporary life sciences.
During the ‘Atomic Age’ after World War II, awareness
about the carcinogenic effects of nuclear radiation, new
chemical substances and air pollutants increased. Well into
the 1980s, a dominant political answer (for dealing with
the risks the technological progress brought with it) was a
regulatory regime that controlled emissions of radiation
and substances by setting limit values. This regulatory re-
gime treated individuals as vulnerable, passive objects of ir-
reversible, harmful, mutational effects of carcinogenetic
factors penetrating individual bodies. The general regula-
tory rationale in policy was to protect the citizen. What
caused cancer? ‘The industry!’ was the dominant reply.
Proctor17 called this regime ‘body victimology’.
The situation slowly changed during the 1980s when,
despite new political regulations, two developments came
together: (i) more and more scientific evidence became
available that there are individual differences in cancer-
relevant cell repair mechanisms (pp. 143–9);18 and (ii)
control for the environmental and chemical hazards turned
out to be very hard: there were too many of them, predict-
ive value of mutagenic tests were unreliable and ‘many of
the artificial risk factors were so tightly connected with the
demands and benefits of modern life that their removal
was impracticable from economic and social standpoints’,
as Schwerin put it (p. 150).18 We got used to and depend-
ent on what caused the higher risk of cancer.
As a consequence of (i) and (ii), the vulnerable citizen
over time became an active agent to be governed. The new
regulatory rationale was ‘body machismo’, as Proctor17
called it. The imperative slowly became to govern the
body: citizens were asked to boost their repair mechan-
isms, e.g. by eating fresh vegetables and buying products
from the health industry, e.g. artificially produced micro-
nutrients. If people got cancer, it was because they did not
boost their self-regulation-machinery properly. The cause
of cancer was now increasingly regarded to be found in in-
dividuals who act in correct or wrong ways; increasingly in
the background of the causal attributions was the environ-
ment, containing radiation and substances emitted by a
growing industry of energy, food and pharmaceutical pro-
duction that served a consumer culture which people be-
came used to and dependent on.
In the language used by toxicogenetics, as Schwerin re-
ported, the detrimental environmental influences that had
once been conceived as ‘bullets’ hitting passive citizens, be-
came conceived as mere ‘stimulus’, relegated to the back-
ground of political regulation regimes, a mere ‘biochemical
signal triggering a cascade of molecular reactions’ in abnor-
mal human beings (p. 147).18 A normal human, with her or
his evolved repair mechanisms, who took care of herself or
himself, would not get cancer. That was the new regulatory
slogan. From then onwards, the ‘organism was not a ready-
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made victim of fateful radioactive or genotoxic dis-
turbances; instead, here was an organism which was
built to handle those environmental factors’ (p. 148).18 This
organism finally became the ‘entrepreneurial self’ of the
‘new bourgeois lifestyle’ of health and sustainability
(LoHaS), a ‘flexible self that works around the clock to
compensate for exposure to altered environments [. . .] busy
handling risk factors’ (p. 156),18 whereas others make big
business producing the environmental hazards in the
background.
What is the cause of cancer? The environmental haz-
ards? Or individual differences in repair mechanisms? It
depends on what you are prepared to politically intervene
on: the toxin-emitting industry, or those individuals who
mainly have to face those toxins. And as we all know,
some people have to face much more of these toxins, which
is how people of colour, for instance, end up having higher
rates of cancer: a gene for a certain skin colour (rather
than a cancer-specific gene in this group of people) leads to
social discrimination (racism), which increases the prob-
ability of ending up in harmful environments, which in
turn increases the probability of cancer.
Generalization: research on genetic
explanation in contemporary life sciences
As many in industrialized countries have for a long time
now not been prepared to change their consumerism,
many in these countries are not prepared to change social
inequalities, or other aspects of our shared and non-shared
environment. If so, these people will tend to put the causal
factor social inequality to the background and rather inves-
tigate what difference genes (and other internal-to-the-
individual-body causal factors) make. That way they
(those in power) will not have to change anything about
the structure of the respective society, whereas others (indi-
viduals who exhibit individual differences, i.e. who are not
‘normal’) will have to.
Geneticization of traits (i.e. explaining something as
being due to genes) involves medicalization, because genes
are causal factors internal to bodies. When medicalization
is involved, financial interests are too. As Gannett
(p. 359)9 reminded us: ‘The Unites States government has
been motivated to fund the Human Genome Project for the
sake of the health not only of the American people but of
its developing biotechnology industry’. ‘Blaming genes’, as
she states, ‘draws society’s attention away from unhealthy
environments and weakens its commitment to address fac-
tors such as poverty, cigarette smoking (and tobacco ad-
vertisements), exposure to pollutants, and racism, which
all contribute to these diseases’ (p. 455)19 (racism, not
race!).
Kitcher made a point similar to that of Gannett, even
though it is the risks of the family members of those in
power and wealth that define the context:
Those of us who live comfortably worry less that our
sons and daughters will suffer from neglect or abuse—
we, after all, intend to provide them with safe and
nurturing environments. But we are not immune to dis-
aster. The genes may strike, and if they do, all our effort
will be in vain. Accordingly, we are very interested in
one kind of cause of the diminution in quality of peo-
ple’s lives. Other kinds of causes, environmental factors
that wreak havoc with lives, are not (perceived as) our
problem (p. 311).20 (cf. (pp. 131–2)21)
It is the same ‘logic’ of willingness to control: there are
social reasons for backgrounding environment (inequality
as not important to change, or even as important to stay)
and there might be further reasons for foregrounding genes
(since some people want to have forward control over
them).
In addition to these more social aspects, there is also an
aspect of our biased way of dealing with genetic causes
that is more pertinent to intrinsic scientific interests, and
this aspect should be mentioned as well, in order to illus-
trate the relevance of the willingness-to-control principle
for understanding contemporary life sciences. There is a
tradition in the parity debate on genetic causation that I
call instrumentalist. The instrumentalist claim is that genes
are prioritized in explanations of diseases or other traits
because in experimental contexts they are better instru-
mental handles, i.e. technologically more tractable than
environmental factors.9,20,22–24 The assumption is that
we can screen and experimentally intervene in precise
ways in genes, but we cannot screen or intervene in the
environment in a similar technologically easy way. Genes
are tractable and the environment is not. In other
words, instrumentalists assume that geneticists have
better control (forward and backward) over genes than
over the environment, and therefore focus on genes as
explainers.
Although this instrumentalist approach to prioritizing
genes can be directly derived from Collingwood’s control
principle (and Collingwood is often mentioned with re-
spect to this), it ignores two important points: first, geneti-
cists focused on genes long before they had such incredible
means of experimental control on genes; second, as
Gannett (p. 358)9 said, there are ‘nongenetic factors both
internal and external to the organism [that] are amenable
to experimental manipulation’, and they are backgrounded
nonetheless.
The list of environmental factors (relevant for the devel-
opment of an organism) is certainly indefinitely large; fur-
thermore, there are indeed many environmental factors
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that still are (and may always be) beyond our experimental
control, partly because the environment is so incredibly
more complex than the genome. Thus, the representation
of environmental causal factors will often be, as Kitcher
(p. 402)21 says, characterized by ‘fragility’ rather than
tractability. Yet, some environmental factors (e.g. water or
oxygen supply in plants) have been easy to control at a
time when people did not know anything about genes, a
time when genes were purely hypothetical entities. These
environmental factors were, however, often simply used to
standardize the experiment in order to have a controlled
setting for testing the effect of differences in genetic fac-
tors. They were controlled in the conservative sense, i.e.
used as mere standing conditions, fixed and controlled in
the background of the ‘genetic theatre’, stabilizing what’s
going on. If you have the means to control the environmen-
tal factor, you might still background it; if you don’t have
the means to control genetic factors, you might still select
them as the cause for a disease. It all depends on what you
care about and in which sense. And geneticists simply care
about genes. It is their job.
The ability to manipulate can therefore not explain the
prioritizing that we saw for roughly the first three-quarters
of the 20th century, and it cannot explain the prioritizing
between equally controllable factors, i.e. in cases where
having the means to control something still leaves room
for a choice. It is the preparedness to intervene and not the
ability to control that guides causal selection. If you hope
to get in the future (or have already) the technological
means to study (and thus control) a causal factor in the la-
boratory, or if the other factors (those relegated to the
background) should (or could, given your interests) stay as
they are, then you will focus on that causal factor that you
are willing to intervene on.
What you are prepared to control, as well as what is
easy or convenient to intervene on, depends on who you
are and what you care about. Geneticists and the pharma-
ceutical industry care about handles they can (or hope to
be able to) intervene on, because they get refutation from
that, or money or both, or because they are driven by some
theoretical or personal belief in the importance of this or
that. Gannett9 mentioned the example of the scientist
Jerome Lejeune, who not only discovered the genetic cause
of Down syndrome (caused by an extra chromosome 21),
but went on trying to find other causes via studying the
mechanisms by which the disease comes about, given the
extra chromosome. His search for nongenetic causal fac-
tors was motivated by his opposition to abortion. Whether
a baby will be born or not, was not what he was prepared
to intervene in. His goal was consequently ‘to find some
other “handle” by means of which to intervene in the treat-
ment or prevention of the symptoms associated with Down
syndrome’ (p. 367).9
Other people might have different interests, be prepared
to change different things, and therefore explain things dif-
ferently. The willingness-to-control principle of causal se-
lection can thus explain relevant agreement in causal
explanations as well as disagreements, by reference to
agreement or disagreement in what we care about or ap-
preciate being changed (foreground) or care about or ac-
cept staying normal (background). Collingwood’s
‘principle of the relativity of causes’ holds, even though on
the basis of willingness to control rather than on the basis
of controllability itself.
How about the looping effect in these cases from the
life sciences? I have space only for the last case, the Down
syndrome example: if we foreground the genetic factors
and intervene accordingly, then this will change the genetic
pattern of difference in the world. This is how norms make
causes real. In the case at issue, the change in the pattern of
difference is towards an eugenically homogenized world.
(It will certainly never be a completely homogenized world
since genes are hard to discipline, maybe even harder to
discipline than kids.)
Conclusion
Normality and control are two important principles guiding us in
our biased way of dealing with causes in practical sciences.
As mentioned, control has a Janus-faced nature: it can mean that
you can change something at will or that you are able to keep some-
thing on track, i.e. normal. Collingwood referred to control in the
first, forward sense only. Hart and Honore´ rightly argued that he
ignored normality, but without seeing that what they call normality
is just one way of controlling things: keeping things normal, a con-
servative kind of control. The willingness-to-control principle shows
that control is the more inclusive principle.
Collingwood’s control principle, which states that people go for
the by-you-actually-controllable cause, can be replaced with a will-
ingness-to-control principle that states that people go for causes if
these are (or believed to become) manipulable and if it is not against
their respective interest to have them manipulated.
The willingness-to-control principle captures how norms make
causes. First, norms make causes visible in the causal field (i.e. our
representation of a causal situation). Representing something is the
first step towards a causal explanation. The norms, so to say, act as
a frame for the causal picture that we wish to draw. By drawing a
line, a frame, we causally select from an ontic causal structure
(causal dependence relations in the world) certain parts of the struc-
ture we would be willing to change, and vice versa: we put causal
factors to the background, not just because what they refer to is stat-
istically normal, but because we want to keep it normal. By keeping
it normal, we, secondly, create a looping effect and thus make causes
real: we stabilize the statistical as well as the normative norm and
thus make what is there to select (the ontic causal structure, i.e. the
pattern of differences) for later causal explanations in later instances
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of causal selection. Collingwood’s control principle is thus highly
relevant to understanding how norms make causes.
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